This page presents a handful of the letters in Margaret Cavendish’s 1664 Philosophical Letters. They are letters 1, 4, 30, 35, and 36 of part 1.
The text is based on a copy of Cavendish’s book held by the University of Toronto library, using a scanned version available at https://archive.org/details/philosophicallet00newc.
The text has been modernized in its spelling (although preserving the spelling of people’s names), use of capital letters (although preserving capital letters used after colons), and use of italics. Few changes have been made to Cavendish’s punctuation, the main one being to add apostrophes indicating possession. Other changes to punctuation are marked with square brackets in the text.
Cavendish gives references to other authors using marginal notes. These have been moved into the text as parenthetical references, with the formatting standardized, and placed after the quoted passages where that is appropriate.
1.1
Madam,
You have been pleased to send me the works of four famous and learned authors, to wit, of two most famous philosophers of our age, Des Cartes, and Hobbs, and of that learned philosopher and divine Dr. More, as also of that famous physician and chemist Van Helmont. Which works you have sent me not only to peruse, but also to give my judgment of them, and to send you word by the usual way of our correspondence, which is by letters, how far, and wherein I do dissent from these famous authors’ opinions in natural philosophy. To tell you truly, Madam, your commands did at first much affright me, for it did appear, as if you had commanded me to get upon a high rock, and fling myself into the sea where neither a ship, nor a plank, nor any kind of help was near to rescue me, and save my life; but that I was forced to sink, by reason I cannot swim: So I having no learning or art to assist me in this dangerous undertaking, thought, I must of necessity perish under the rough censures of my readers, and be not only accounted a fool for my labour, but a vain and presumptuous person, to undertake things surpassing the ability of my performance; but on the other side I considered first, that those worthy authors, were they my censurers, would not deny me the same liberty they take themselves; which is, that I may dissent from their opinions, as well as they dissent from others, and from amongst themselves: And if I should express more vanity than wit, more ignorance than knowledge, more folly than discretion, it being according to the nature of our sex, I hoped that my masculine readers would civilly excuse me, and my female readers could not justly condemn me. Next I considered with my self, that it would be a great advantage for my book called Philosophical Opinions, as to make it more perspicuous and intelligible by the opposition of other opinions, since two opposite things placed near each other, are the better discerned; for I must confess, that when I did put forth my philosophical work at first, I was not so well skilled in the terms or expressions usual in natural philosophy; and therefore for want of their knowledge, I could not declare my meaning so plainly and clearly as I ought to have done, which may be a sufficient argument to my readers, that I have not read heretofore any natural philosophers, and taken some light from them; but that my opinions did merely issue from the fountain of my own brain, without any other help or assistance. Wherefore since for want of proper expressions, my named book of philosophy was accused of obscurity and intricacy, I thought your commands would be a means to explain and clear it the better, although not by an artificial way, as by logical arguments or mathematical demonstrations, yet by expressing my sense and meaning more properly than I have done heretofore: But the chief reason of all was, the authority of your command, which did work so powerfully with me, that I could not resist, although it were to the disgrace of my own judgment and wit; and therefore I am fully resolved now to go on as far, and as well as the natural strength of my reason will reach: But since neither the strength of my body, nor of my understanding, or wit, is able to mark every line, or every word of their works, and to argue upon them, I shall only pick out the ground opinions of the aforementioned authors, and those which do directly dissent from mine, upon which I intend to make some few reflections, according to the ability of my reason; and I shall merely go upon the bare ground of natural philosophy, and not mix divinity with it, as many philosophers use to do, except it be in those places, where I am forced by the authors’ arguments to reflect upon it, which yet shall rather be with an expression of my ignorance, than a positive declaration of my opinion or judgment thereof; for I think it not only an absurdity, but an injury to the holy profession of divinity to draw her to the proofs in natural philosophy; wherefore I shall strictly follow the guidance of natural reason, and keep to my own ground and principles as much as I can; which that I may perform the better, I humbly desire the help and assistance of your favour, that according to that real and entire affection you bear to me, you would be pleased to tell me unfeignedly, if I should chance to err or contradict but the least probability of truth in any thing; for I honor truth so much, as I bow down to its shadow with the greatest respect and reverence; and I esteem those persons most, that love and honor truth with the same zealous zeal and fervour, whether they be ancient or modern writers.
Thus, Madam, although I am destitute of the help of arts, yet being supported by your favour and wise directions, I shall not fear any smiles of scorn, or words of reproach; for I am confident you will defend me against all the mischievous and poisonous teeth of malicious detractors. I shall besides, implore the assistance of the sacred church, and the learned schools, to take me into their protection, and shelter my weak endeavours: For though I am but an ignorant and simple woman, yet I am their devoted and honest servant, who shall never quit the respect and honor due to them, but live and die theirs, as also,
Madam,
Your Ladyship’s
humble and faithful servant.
1.4
Madam,
I have chosen, in the first place, the work of that famous philosopher Hobbs, called Leviathan, wherein I find he says, that the cause of sense or sensitive perception is the external body or object, which presses the organ proper to each sense (Leviathan, ch.1). To which I answer, according to the ground of my own Philosophical Opinions, that all things, and therefore outward objects as well as sensitive organs, have both sense and reason, yet neither the objects nor the organs are the cause of them; for perception is but the effect of the sensitive and rational motions, and not the motions of the perception; neither does the pressure of parts upon parts make perception; for although matter by the power of self-motion is as much composable as dividable, and parts do join to parts, yet that does not make perception; nay, the several parts, betwixt which the perception is made, may be at such a distance, as not capable to press: As for example, two men may see or hear each other at a distance, and yet there may be other bodies between them, that do not move to those perceptions, so that no pressure can be made, for all pressures are by some constraint and force; wherefore, according to my opinion, the sensitive and rational free motions, do pattern out each other’s object, as figure and voice in each other’s eye and ear; for life and knowledge, which I name rational and sensitive matter, are in every creature, and in all parts of every creature, and make all perceptions in nature, because they are the self-moving parts of nature, and according as those corporeal, rational, and sensitive motions move, such or such perceptions are made: But these self-moving parts being of different degrees (for the rational matter is purer than the sensitive) it causes a double perception in all creatures, whereof one is made by the rational corporeal motions, and the other by the sensitive; and though both perceptions are in all the body, and in every part of the body of a creature, yet the sensitive corporeal motions having their proper organs, as work-houses, in which they work some sorts of perceptions, those perceptions are most commonly made in those organs, and are double again; for the sensitive motions work either on the inside or on the outside of those organs, on the inside in dreams, on the outside awake; and although both the rational and the sensitive matter are inseparably joined and mixed together, yet do they not always work together, for oftentimes the rational works without any sensitive patterns, and the sensitive again without any rational patterns. But mistake me not, Madam, for I do not absolutely confine the sensitive perception to the organs, nor the rational to the brain, but as they are both in the whole body, so they may work in the whole body according to their own motions. Neither do I say, that there is no other perception in the eye but sight, in the ear but hearing, and so forth, but the sensitive organs have other perceptions besides these; and if the sensitive and rational motions be irregular in those parts, between which the perception is made, as for example, in the two afore-mentioned men, that see and hear each other, then they both neither see nor hear each other perfectly; and if one’s motions be perfect, but the other’s irregular and erroneous, then one sees and hears better than the other; or if the sensitive and rational motions move more regularly and make perfecter patterns in the eye than in the ear, then they see better than they hear; and if more regularly and perfectly in the ear than in the eye, they hear better than they see: And so it may be said of each man singly, for one man may see the other better and more perfectly, than the other may see him; whereas, if perception were made by pressure, there would not be any such mistakes; besides the hard pressure of objects, in my opinion, would rather annoy and obscure, than inform. But as soon as the object is removed, the perception of it, made by the sensitive motions in the organs, ceases, by reason the sensitive motions cease from patterning, but yet the rational motions do not always cease so suddenly, because the sensitive corporeal motions work with the inanimate matter, and therefore cannot retain particular figures long, whereas the rational matter does only move in its own substance and parts of matter, and upon none other, as my book of Philosophical Opinions will inform you better. And thus perception, in my opinion, is not made by pressure, nor by species, nor by matter going either from the organ to the object, or from the object into the organ. By this it is also manifest, that understanding comes not from exterior objects, or from the exterior sensitive organs; for as exterior objects do not make perception, so they do neither make understanding, but it is the rational matter that does it, for understanding may be without exterior objects and sensitive organs; And this in short is the opinion of
Madam,
Your faithful friend
and servant.
1.30
Madam,
I am reading now the works of that famous and most renowned author, Des Cartes, out of which I intend to pick only those discourses which I like best, and not to examine his opinions, as they go along from the beginning to the end of his books; and in order to do this, I have chosen in the first place, his discourse of motion, and do not assent to his opinion, when he defines motion to be only a mode of a thing, and not the thing or body itself (Principles 2.25); for, in my opinion, there can be no abstraction made of motion from body, neither really, nor in the manner of our conception, for how can I conceive that which is not, nor cannot be in nature, that is, to conceive motion without body? Wherefore motion is but one thing with body, without any separation or abstraction soever. Neither does it agree with my reason, that one body can give or transfer motion into another body; and as much motion it gives or transfers into that body, as much loses it: As for example, in two hard bodies thrown against one another, where one, that is thrown with greater force, takes the other along with it, and loses as much motion as it gives it (Principles 2.40). For how can motion, being no substance, but only a mode, quit one body, and pass into another? One body may either occasion, or imitate another’s motion, but can neither give nor take away what belongs to its own or another body’s substance, no more than matter can quit its own nature from being matter; and therefore my opinion is, that if motion does go out of one body into another, then substance goes too; for motion, and substance or body, as afore-mentioned, are all one thing, and then all bodies that receive motion from other bodies, must needs increase in their substance and quantity, and those bodies which impart or transfer motion, must decrease as much as they increase: Truly, Madam, that neither motion nor figure should subsist by themselves, and yet be transferrable into other bodies, is very strange, and as much as to prove them to be nothing, and yet to say they are something. The like may be said of all others, which they call accidents, as skill, learning, knowledge, etc[,] saying, they are no bodies, because they have no extension, but inherent in bodies or substances as in their subjects; for although the body may subsist without them, yet they being always with the body, body and they are all one thing: And so is power and body, for body cannot quit power, nor power the body, being all one thing. But to return to motion, my opinion is, that all matter is partly animate, and partly inanimate, and all matter is moving and moved, and that there is no part of nature that has not life and knowledge, for there is no part that has not a commixture of animate and inanimate matter; and though the inanimate matter has no motion, nor life and knowledge of itself, as the animate has, nevertheless being both so closely joined and commixed as in one body, the inanimate moves as well as the animate, although not in the same manner; for the animate moves of itself, and the inanimate moves by the help of the animate, and thus the animate is moving and the inanimate moved; not that the animate matter transfers, infuses, or communicates its own motion to the inanimate; for this is impossible, by reason it cannot part with its own nature, nor alter the nature of inanimate matter, but each retains its own nature; for the inanimate matter remains inanimate, that is, without self-motion, and the animate loses nothing of its self-motion, which otherwise it would, if it should impart or transfer its motion into the inanimate matter; but only as I said heretofore, the inanimate works or moves with the animate, because of their close union and commixture; for the animate forces or causes the inanimate matter to work with her; and thus one is moving, the other moved, and consequently there is life and knowledge in all parts of nature, by reason in all parts of nature there is a commixture of animate and inanimate matter: and this life and knowledge is sense and reason, or sensitive and rational corporeal motions, which are all one thing with animate matter without any distinction or abstraction, and can no more quit matter, than matter can quit motion. Wherefore every creature being composed of this commixture of animate and inanimate matter, has also self-motion, that is life and knowledge, sense and reason, so that no part has need to give or receive motion to or from another part; although it may be an occasion of such a manner of motion to another part, and cause it to move thus or thus: as for example, a watchmaker does not give the watch its motion, but he is only the occasion, that the watch moves after that manner, for the motion of the watch is the watch’s own motion, inherent in those parts ever since that matter was, and if the watch ceases to move after such a manner or way, that manner or way of motion is nevertheless in those parts of matter, the watch is made of, and if several other figures should be made of that matter, the power of moving in the said manner or mode, would yet still remain in all those parts of matter as long as they are body, and have motion in them. Wherefore one body may occasion another body to move so or so, but not give it any motion, but every body (though occasioned by another, to move in such a way) moves by its own natural motion; for self motion is the very nature of animate matter, and is as much in hard, as in fluid bodies, although your author denies it, saying, the nature of fluid bodies consists in the motion of those little insensible parts into which they are divided, and the nature of hard bodies, when those little particles joined closely together, do rest (Principles 2.54); for there is no rest in nature; wherefore if there were a world of gold, and a world of air, I do verily believe, that the world of gold would be as much interiously active, as the world of air exteriously; for nature’s motions are not all external or perceptible by our senses, neither are they all circular, or only of one sort, but there is an infinite change and variety of motions; for though I say in my Philosophical Opinions, as there is but one only matter, so there is but one only motion (part 1, ch.5); yet I do not mean, there is but one particular sort of motions, as either circular, or straight, or the like, but that the nature of motion is one and the same, simple and entire in itself, that is, it is mere motion, or nothing else but corporeal motion; and that as there are infinite divisions or parts of matter, so there are infinite changes and varieties of motions, which is the reason that I call motion as well infinite as matter; first that matter and motion are but one thing, and if matter be infinite, motion must be so too; and secondly, that motion is infinite in its changes and variations, as matter is in its parts. And thus much of motion for this time; I add no more, but rest,
Madam,
Your faithful friend,
and servant.
1.35
Madam,
That the mind, according to your author’s opinion, is a substance really distinct from the body, and may be actually separated from it and subsist without it: If he mean the natural mind and soul of man, not the supernatural or divine, I am far from his opinion; for though the mind moves only in its own parts, and not upon, or with the parts of inanimate matter, yet it cannot be separated from these parts of matter, and subsist by itself, as being a part of one and the same matter the inanimate is of, (for there is but only one matter, and one kind of matter, although of several degrees,) only it is the self-moving part; but yet this cannot empower it, to quit the same natural body, whose part it is. Neither can I apprehend, that the mind’s or soul’s seat should be in the glandula or kernel of the brain, and there sit like a spider in a cobweb, to whom the least motion of the cobweb gives intelligence of a fly, which he is ready to assault, and that the brain should get intelligence by the animal spirits as his servants, which run to and fro like ants to inform it; or that the mind should, according to others’ opinions, be a light, and embroidered with ideas, like a herald’s coat; and that the sensitive organs should have no knowledge in themselves, but serve only like peeping-holes for the mind, or barn doors to receive bundles of pressures, like sheaves of corn; for there being a thorough mixture of animate, rational and sensitive, and inanimate matter, we cannot assign a certain seat or place to the rational, another to the sensitive, and another to the inanimate, but they are diluted and intermixed throughout all the body; and this is the reason, that sense and knowledge cannot be bound only to the head or brain: But although they are mixed together, nevertheless they do not lose their interior natures by this mixture, nor their purity and subtlety, nor their proper motions or actions, but each moves according to its nature and substance, without confusion; the actions of the rational part in man, which is the mind or soul, are called thoughts, or thoughtful perceptions, which are numerous, and so are the sensitive perceptions; for though man, or any other animal has but five exterior sensitive organs, yet there be numerous perceptions made in these sensitive organs, and in all the body; nay, every pore of the flesh is a sensitive organ, as well as the eye, or ear. But both sorts, as well the rational as the sensitive, are different from each other, although both do resemble another, as being both parts of animate matter, as I have mentioned before: Wherefore I’ll add no more, only let you know, that I constantly remain,
Madam,
Your faithful friend,
and servant.
1.36
Madam,
That all other animals, besides man, want reason, your author endeavours to prove in his discourse of method, where his chief argument is, that other animals cannot express their mind, thoughts or conceptions, either by speech or any other signs, as man can do: For, says he, it is not for want of the organs belonging to the framing of words, as we may observe in parrots and pies, which are apt enough to express words they are taught, but understand nothing of them. My answer is, that one man expressing his mind by speech or words to another, does not declare by it his excellency and supremacy above all other creatures, but for the most part more folly, for a talking man is not so wise as a contemplating man. But by reason other creatures cannot speak or discourse with each other as men, or make certain signs, whereby to express themselves as dumb and deaf men do, should we conclude, they have neither knowledge, sense, reason, or intelligence? Certainly, this is a very weak argument; for one part of a man’s body, as one hand, is not less sensible than the other, nor the heel less sensible than the heart, nor the leg less sensible than the head, but each part has its sense and reason, and so consequently its sensitive and rational knowledge, and although they cannot talk or give intelligence to each other by speech, nevertheless each has its own peculiar and particular knowledge, just as each particular man has his own particular knowledge, for one man’s knowledge is not another man’s knowledge; and if there be such a peculiar and particular knowledge in every several part of one animal creature, as man, well may there be such in creatures of different kinds and sorts: But this particular knowledge belonging to each creature, does not prove that there is no knowledge at all betwixt them, no more than the want of human knowledge does prove the want of reason; for reason is the rational part of matter, and makes perception, observation, and intelligence different in every creature, and every sort of creatures, according to their proper natures, but perception, observation and intelligence do not make reason, reason being the cause, and they the effects. Wherefore though other creatures have not the speech, nor mathematical rules and demonstrations, with other arts and sciences, as men; yet may their perceptions and observations be as wise as men’s, and they may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after their own manner and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave them, and man to his conceited prerogative and excellence, resting,
Madam,
Your faithful friend,
and servant.
Stewart Duncan 